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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN THE
WAKE OF LIABILITY REFORM
W. KIP VISCUSI and PATRICIA BORN*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the effect of the liability reforms on medical malpractice
insurance over the 1984-91 period. This is the first study to use data by firm and
by state for every firm writing medical malpractice insurance over that time pe-
riod. The liability reforms increased insurance profitability (that is, decreased the
loss ratios), where the main mechanism of influence was through decreasing
losses. The quantile regression estimates imply that the greatest effects of liability
reform are on the most unprofitable firms and that the effect is not uniform across
the entire market. This pattern is consistent with the other principal finding,
which is that damages caps appear to be most influential.
I. INTRODUCTION
A PRINCIPAL target of the tort liability reform efforts in the 1980s was
medical malpractice insurance. Unlike relatively stable insurance lines,
such as homeowners' insurance and automobile insurance, medical mal-
practice premiums had escalated substantially in the mid-1980s, almost
doubling in size from 1984 to 1986.' The rise in medical malpractice pre-
miums has been blamed for a variety of ills of the health care sector.2
Some observers suggested that medical malpractice premiums led doctors
to change their fields of specialization to avoid high litigation pursuits.
Others suggested that medical malpractice premiums led to unnecessary
procedures and, particularly, unnecessary tests. More generally, some
have blamed medical malpractice costs for the overall rise in health care
* Viscusi is George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke University. Born is with the
American Medical Association. Frank Sloan and an anonymous referee provided helpful
comments.
See Insurance Information Institute, The Fact Book: 1992 Property/Casualty Insurance
Facts 29 (1992).
2 For a broader discussion of these issues, see Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice
(1985); and Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation (1993).
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costs in the economy even though medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums comprised under 1 percent of total health care costs.
To address these perceived ills of the medical malpractice liability sys-
tem, a variety of states enacted reform measures in the mid-1980s. This
effort echoed similar reform initiatives undertaken in the 1970s.3 The
most popular types of reform were various types of damages caps, which
pertained to noneconomic damages, punitive damages, and in some
cases, the total value of all damages. To the extent that such constraints
are binding, they will achieve the objective of cost reduction. However,
the extent of the effect on cost reduction is unclear. In 1993, the chairman
of the American Bar Association's working group on health care reform
concluded that -[c]aps on noneconomic damages have not had the dra-
matic impact that supporters think." 4
Damages caps may be binding in very few instances,5 and in those
instances in which they are binding juries may find other ways to adjust
the components of the award so that the effect on medical malpractice
costs will not be substantial. The primary purpose of this article is to
examine the effect of medical malpractice reforms, such as damages caps,
on medical malpractice insurance costs in the 1980s.
In doing so, we will not question the underlying social desirability of
the reform efforts but simply address their efficacy in achieving their
intended objective of cost control. The structure of the medical malprac-
tice reforms is certainly not ideal from the standpoint of tort liability
reform.6 For example, a rigid damages cap of, for example, $250,000 on
3 The 1970s reforms involved 43 states enacting legislation relating to tort law. Specifi-
cally, all states adopted legislation relating to insurance availability or medical discipline.
The continuing rise in medical malpractice premiums prompted a second attempt to contain
costs, with the primary focus on limiting damages awards. See Danzon, supra note 2, for
a description of the earlier efforts.
4 See Associated Press release (August 9, 1993) for the statement of Clifford D. Strom-
berg, chairman of the American Bar Association Working Group on health care reform.
5 For documentation of the small frequency of cases that are affected by pain and suffer-
ing caps in the product liability area, see W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product
Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards? 8 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
203-20 (1988). A similar point is made with respect to medical malpractice caps by Danzon,
supra note 2.
6 See, for example, the discussion in Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial (1991);
W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991); and American Law Institute, Enter-
prise Responsibility for Personal Injury-Reporter's Study (Vol. 1, The Institutional Frame-
work, & 2, Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change) (1991). Detailed reviews of
insurance market effects of tort liability are provided by Richard A. Epstein, Modem Prod-
ucts Liability Law (1980); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461-527
(1985); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale L.
J. 1521-90 (1987); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
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noneconomic damages will continue to permit possibly excessive jury
awards for insignificant injuries, such as temporary poisonings, while at
the same time limiting awards to more deserving victims, such as the
catastrophically injured, who may suffer from brain damage or paraple-
gia.7 More generally, a primary effect of such damages reforms is to limit
the transfers from physicians and their insurers to plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases. It should be noted, however, that ultimately medical
malpractice insurance costs will primarily be borne by patients. 8
All limits of this type are clearly not desirable, since otherwise it would
be optimal to abolish medical malpractice liability altogether. The social
desirability of the reform efforts hinges not only on their efficacy in affect-
ing liability costs but also on their effect on incentives to provide the
efficient quality and quantity of health care and to provide appropriate
levels of insurance to accident victims. A comprehensive assessment of
the desirability of the reform efforts consequently would require a case-
by-case analysis of the rationale and implications of the reform measures,
which is beyond the scope of what is being undertaken here.
The principal issues we address pertain to the overall insurance market
effects of the reform efforts in 1985-87. 9 Most fundamentally, do medical
malpractice liability reforms affect the profitability of insurance? Have
these effects exerted themselves by decreasing the losses experienced by
insurers, which one would expect if the reform efforts were successful,
or do the reform efforts simply reflect an increased governmental interest
in insurance profitability, which has led regulators to allow firms simply
to raise premium levels? What has been the character of the effect of the
reform efforts on the distribution of liability costs? Ideally, one would
Synthesis, 97 Yale L. J. 353-419 (1988); and Ralph A. Winter, Solvency Regulation and
the Property-Liability "Insurance Cycle," 29 Econ. Inquiry 458-71 (1991).
7 Some observers suggest that the appropriate cap on noneconomic damages would be
to eliminate them altogether since individuals would not choose to provide compensation
for pain and suffering losses. Others have suggested that in situations where deterrence is
a principal concern, compensation for pain and suffering should be much larger than current
liability awards.
8 See Patricia M. Danzon, Mark V. Pauly, & Raynard S. Kington, The Effects of Mal-
practice Litigation on Physicians' Fees and Incomes, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 122-27 (1990).
9 A number of studies evaluate alternative measures of the effectiveness of the liability
reforms. These include a study of physician malpractice premiums, claims, and awards
(Stephen Zuckerman, Randall R. Bovbjerg, & Frank Sloan, Effects of Tort Reforms and
Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 Inquiry 167-82 (1990)), and
several studies of the effects of the reforms on the frequency and disposition of medical
malpractice claims. See, for example, James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Evaluating
Medical Malpractice Reforms, 7 Contemp. Pol'y Issues 83-98 (1989); and Danzon, supra
note 2.
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expect reform efforts to be most effective in shifting the upper tail of the
distribution of losses and, hence, firms' profitability. In a competitive
market, these profitability effects may be short-run." Thus, the effects
of the liability reforms should not be uniform throughout the entire mar-
ket, but instead should have a differential effect throughout the distribu-
tion of the insurance market. The difference in these effects will be a
principal concern.
Section II will begin the analysis with an examination of the liability
reform experiments in Michigan and Wisconsin. These efforts were more
narrowly focused than most, as they consisted of a reform effort in a
single year, consisting primarily of a damages cap. As a result, they
provide a useful starting point for examining the implications of liability
reform.
The remainder of the article will focus on liability reform on a national
basis, where the types of measures considered and their timing will be
much more diverse. Section III introduces the sample to be used for the
examination of the national effects of medical malpractice liability re-
forms. The data set that will be used for this analysis as well as for the
state-level analysis is on a firm-specific basis, where data are available
by year for each state in which the firm operates. This very rich data set,
which includes over 10,000 observations, provides a much more refined
statistical basis for analysis than the aggregative data by state that are
the focus of most analyses of insurance. Section IV examines the effects
of liability reforms on the most widely used profitability measure-loss
ratios, that is, the ratio of losses to premiums. In addition to presenting
the usual regression models, this section also introduces the use of quan-
tile regression models to examine the effect of liability reform on the
distribution of loss ratios. The examination of the effect of liability reform
on loss and premium levels in Section V suggests that liability reform
exerted its impact by reducing loss levels, and there is some limited
evidence that these reduced losses were passed through as lower premi-
ums. Overall, a substantial part of the reversal in the fortunes of the
medical malpractice insurance market since the mid-1980s can be credited
to the liability reform efforts.
II. LIABILITY REFORM EXPERIMENTS: MICHIGAN AND WISCONSIN
It is instructive to begin examining the effect of liability reform mea-
sures with two narrowly defined liability reform experiments undertaken
10 For example, there will be price competition that can arise even in a regulated environ-
ment if physicians can form their own mutuals or reciprocals.
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in Michigan and Wisconsin. These state efforts were both 1986 statutes
targeted primarily at limiting damages.
In the case of Michigan, the medical malpractice reform consisted of
a cap of $225,000 in noneconomic damages on medical malpractice ac-
tions. " This cap is to be adjusted to reflect changes in the consumer price
index. The cap does not apply in wrongful death actions, actions involv-
ing reproductive system injuries, or actions for loss of a vital bodily
function. The medical malpractice reform measure did include some other
minor provisions pertaining to stricter standards for expert witnesses, a
new mediation system, and a change in the statute of limitations. In
addition to the medical malpractice reform effort, Michigan also enacted
a more general tort liability reform measure for which some of the provis-
ions may have had pertinence to medical malpractice insurance as well.
The tort liability reform provisions included limitations on joint and sev-
eral liability, sanctions on frivolous suits, admission of collateral benefits,
periodic payment of judgments for future damages over $250,000, limita-
tions on dramshop liability, and mediation for civil actions other than
medical malpractice. 2
The reform efforts in Wisconsin were more limited in that a single
provision constituted the focal point of the reform.' 3 In particular, medi-
cal malpractice damages were capped at $1 million. Even the lost earnings
and medical expense component of damages could not exceed $1 million.
Whereas many tort liability reform proponents have provided potentially
sound rationales for limits on noneconomic damages, there has been far
less support for a more general cap on the total value of liability awards,
particularly given the substantial medical expenses that may be required
to rehabilitate accident victims. The other provisions of the Wisconsin
reform effort were relatively minor, as they pertain to regulation of attor-
ney fees in malpractice actions and more stringent medical disciplinary
standards.
The sample used in this and subsequent analyses is the data set devel-
oped by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
for state insurance regulation. Every property and liability company in
each state is required to submit financial data to the NAIC on a yearly
basis. Thus, this data set includes information on every firm selling medi-
cal malpractice insurance nationally. For Michigan and Wisconsin, the
sample size includes 61 firms writing medical malpractice insurance in
Michigan and 48 firms writing medical malpractice insurance in Wiscon-
Mich. H.B. 5154 83d Leg. (1986).
12 See id.
'3 Wis. A.B. 4 1985-87 biennial sess. (1986) (special session).
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sin. Data are available on a yearly basis for 1984-91. The information
available for each firm is quite comprehensive, as it includes data by state
and by line on premiums and losses.
A principal reference point for the analysis will be to examine how the
performance of medical malpractice insurance in these states has com-
pared with that of automobile insurance. The number of firms writing
automobile insurance is considerably larger, as it is 264 in Michigan and
332 in Wisconsin. Automobile insurance was not affected by liability
reform efforts within these states over this period and serves as a useful
benchmark for examining the overall effect of economic conditions on
the likely performance of liability insurance generally. We will then com-
pare the performance of medical malpractice insurance with that of auto-
mobile insurance to examine the difference in the performance in these
two lines and, in particular, how this difference in performance shifted
in the wake of medical malpractice liability reform.
In choosing auto insurance as the reference point, this analysis will
capture insurance market trends generally but will abstract from many
of the distinctive characteristics that affect medical malpractice. The
medical malpractice line is more similar to general liability insurance
than automobile insurance in two respects. First, medical malpractice
and general liability have each been affected by the expansion in tort
liability, whereas automobile insurance has been more stable. Second, as
in the case of medical malpractice, general liability has also been the
target of a wide range of reform efforts. Because of the potential influence
of these reforms, which have been as numerous for general liability as
for medical malpractice, general liability does not serve as a good refer-
ence point for how insurance markets might have performed in the ab-
sence of reform measures. It should be recognized, however, that auto-
mobile insurance does not fully capture all of the key aspects of the
medical malpractice line, and, as a result, the regression analysis below
will undertake a much more comprehensive analysis in order to address
such issues. 14
The loss ratio is the principal measure of insurance profitability. The
loss ratio can be viewed as the inverse of the ex post price of insurance,
or the dollar amount of insurance coverage provided for each dollar in
premiums. More specifically, the loss ratio is the ratio of the losses attrib-
utable to premiums written in a particular year to the value of the premi-
ums earned in that year, where the loss values have been adjusted using
14 One key difference between these lines is the length of the payout tail, or the lag
between the receipt of premiums and the resulting payment of claims. This duration is
longer for medical malpractice, making this line more sensitive to interest rate changes.
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development factors based on industry aggregate loss experience to ac-
count for prospective losses that have not yet been accounted for in the
data. This pattern of rising and then falling loss ratios is not atypical of
the insurance industry. This phenomenon occurs with sufficient fre-
quency and has been designated the underwriting cycle or the liability
insurance cycle. 5 The decline in loss ratios beginning in 1986 conse-
quently may reflect either liability reforms or other time-related influ-
ences not captured in these simple differences, such as those related to
the liability insurance cycle. The regression analysis below will include
appropriate measures of general economic conditions to capture such
influences. Moreover, it also should be noted that much greater stability
is exhibited by automobile insurance, for which the loss ratios range from
0.7 to 1.0 throughout this time interval for both states. 6 The performance
of loss ratios represents a principal focal point of analysis in the insurance
literature dealing with the performance of liability insurance.
The structure of the analysis of the medical malpractice liability reform
experiments in Wisconsin and Michigan can be characterized as the fol-
lowing. The state loss ratio for line I in state s in year t consists of four
components: a time-specific line effect, bi,; a time-varying trend effect
for the state, cs1; a line-varying effect for the state, d1s; and an error term
that depends on the line, the state, and the year, el,,. This gives rise to
the formulation
Loss Ratio,, = bl, + c,, + dj + e,,- (I)
The first expression that will be derived will be to analyze the changes
in the loss ratio for the medical malpractice line over time. In particular,
how does the loss ratio in year t compare with the loss ratio in year t -
j, where the time periods should be selected to capture the before and
after reform era? Upon taking the appropriate differences for equation
(1) for years t and t - j, one obtains
Loss Ratio, - Loss Ratiol,, j = (b, - b, _j) + (c, - c,, _j) (2)
+ (el,5 - el.-j).
The change in loss ratios over time consists of three components, the
last of which is an error term. The first component is the line-specific
15 See Joseph A. Fields & Emilio C. Venezian, Interest Rates and Profit Cycles: A
Disaggregated Approach, 56 J. Risk & Ins. 312-19 (1989); Winter, supra note 6; and Anne
Gron, Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets, 25 RAND
J. Econ. 110-27 (1994).
16 The comparison group, "automobile insurance," is composed of all insurers in automo-
bile liability and physical damage lines.
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change over time. This term will reflect the effect of the medical malprac-
tice liability reform as well as any other shifts that affect the performance
of medical malpractice insurance over time. The second component of
equation (2) is the change over time of the state-specific loss ratio compo-
nent. Factors that affect the change in the loss ratio over time in the
state, such as the change in the state wage rate, will consequently be
reflected in this term.
If instead one calculates the difference in the loss ratios across insur-
ance lines at any point in time, such as between medical malpractice
insurance and automobile, as opposed to within-line differences over
time, the expression is given by
Loss Ratio, - Loss Ratioast = (brat - bat) + (dn, - das) (3)
+ (ernst - east).
The first component of the loss ratio difference represents the difference
in the line-specific time-varying effect. In the postreform era, this term
will reflect the influence of liability reform on bmr The second component
of equation (3) represents the difference in the state-specific performance
of each particular line, and the final term is the error term.
The final comparison is to analyze the difference in the differences of
the loss ratios between lines, or
(Loss Rationst - Loss Ratiom,,, _j)
- (Loss Ratioast - Loss RatiOast j) (4)
= (b., - bra-j) - (bat - bat-j) + "Yt,
where
"yt = ernst - east - erst + east.
The difference in the differences includes two components other than
the error term, but each of these components represents changes in the
line-specific performance over time. The first component on the right
side of equation (4) is the change in the time-specific effect of medical
malpractice insurance, which should reflect the influence of liability re-
form that occurred between years t - j and year t. The second term
represents the shift in the automobile insurance time-varying component
over the same period. To the extent that this term isolates the change in
insurance market performance over time more generally, it will serve to
net out of the first term-the change in the medical malpractice time-
varying term-all influences other than the effect of tort liability.
An examination of the performance of medical malpractice insurance
indicates the striking effect of the 1986 reform efforts in Michigan and
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TABLE 1
MICHIGAN Loss RATIOS, 1984-91: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VS. AUTOMOBILE
A. Loss RATIOS
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Medical malpractice (MM):
Mean 1.428 1.615 .874 .988 .780 .630 .659 .723
Standard error .182 .592 .362 2.669 .130 .057 .066 .052
Automobile:
Mean .858 .855 .882 1.027 .811 .942 .975 .755
Standard error .028 .024 .025 .050 .020 .023 .032 .028
MM - Auto .570* .760 -. 008 -. 040 -. 031 -. 312* -. 316* -. 033
Standard error .184 .592 .363 2.669 .131 .062 .073 .059
B. Loss RATIO DIFFERENCES
1986 - 1987 - 1988 - 1989 - 1990 - 1991 -
1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985
MM mean -.741 -.628 -.835 -. 985* -.957 -.893
Standard error .694 2.734 .606 .594 .595 .594
Auto mean .027 .173* - .044 .087* .120* -. 100*
Standard error .035 .056 .031 .033 .040 .037
MM - Auto -. 768 -. 800 -. 791 - 1.072* - 1.076* - .793
Standard error .579 2.735 .607 .595 .596 .595
* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test, using the two-sample z-test.
Wisconsin. Table 1 provides loss ratio information for Michigan, and
Table 2 includes comparable information for Wisconsin. All loss ratios
in these tables have been weighted by premiums earned and pertain to
the ratio of losses incurred to premiums earned for each year.17 The top
panels of the tables present information by year with respect to the loss
ratios for both medical malpractice and automobile insurance as well as
the difference in these ratios, and the bottom panels present information
on the differences with respect to the prereform year 1985.
In both Michigan and Wisconsin, the loss ratios were at a level that
generated underwriting losses over the 1984-85 period, as the medical
malpractice loss ratios ranged from 1.4 to 1.7.18 Beginning in 1986, there
was a dramatic downward shift in loss ratios for both Michigan and Wis-
consin, and from 1987 and thereafter these loss ratios were consistently
below 1.0.
17 This weighting scheme results in a value for the loss ratio which is essentially the
state-level loss ratio: state total losses divided by total premiums.
18 Underwriting losses do not necessarily imply real economic losses since losses are not
discounted, or, viewed somewhat differently, there is a rate of interest that can be earned
on premiums that must be recognized.
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TABLE 2
WISCONSIN Loss RATIOS, 1984-91: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VS. AUTOMOBILE
A. Loss RATIOS
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Medical malpractice (MM):
Mean 1.691 1.658 1.113 .652 .605 .497 .735 .542
Standard error .423 .954 .050 .100 .029 .038 .082 .047
Automobile:
Mean .831 .836 .711 .666 .710 .749 .742 .710
Standard error .017 .018 .019 .014 .013 .012 .014 .019
MM - Auto .860* .822 .401* -. 014 -. 105* -.252* -. 007 -. 168*
Standard error .423 .954 .054 .101 .032 .040 .083 .051
B. Loss RATIO DIFFERENCES
1986 - 1987 - 1988 - 1989 - 1990 - 1991 -
1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985
MM mean -. 545 -1.006 -1.053 -1.160 -.923 -1.116
Standard error .955 .959 .954 .954 .957 .955
Auto mean -. 125* -.170* -.126* -.086* -.094* -.126*
Standard error .026 .023 .022 .022 .023 .026
MM - Auto - .421 - .836 -.927 -1.074 - .829 -.990
Standard error .955 .959 .954 .954 .957 .955
* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test, using the two-sample z-test.
The first set of differences presented in (the MM - Auto rows of)
Tables 1 and 2 pertain to the differences between medical malpractice
and automobile insurance. These differences are positive for the prere-
form period before 1986, and there is a stark drop that begins in 1986 in
Michigan and which takes place over the 2-year period 1986-87 in Wis-
consin. The positive difference is statistically significant in 1984, and the
negative differences are statistically significant in 1989 and 1990.
The bottom panels of Tables 1 and 2 present information with respect
to the differences relative to the prereform year of 1985. Whereas these
differences are comparatively small and often statistically insignificant
for automobile insurance, in the case of medical malpractice these differ-
ences are consistently substantial. Moreover, the extent of the difference
does not dissipate over time, so that liability reform did not simply have
a temporary effect on profitability. Rather, there was a long-term shift of
the loss ratios over time.
The difference in the change in medical malpractice loss ratios and the
auto insurance loss ratios over time (that is, the difference in the differ-
ences) appears in the bottom row of Tables 1 and 2. These effects also
imply a shift from the loss ratio levels before 1986, as the magnitude of
the difference in the differences ranges from 0.4 to 1.08. In two of the
cases, the differences are statistically significant.
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TABLE 3
Loss RATIOS: MEDIANS AND 75th PERCENTILES
(Standard Errors Are in Parentheses)
A. MICHIGAN
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Medical malpractice:
Median 1.094 1.421 .848 1.096 .591 .532 .677 .486
(.034) (.034) (.026) (.036) (.013) (.013) (.010) (.010)
75th percentile 4.025 3.213 1.706 2.622 .802 .728 .975 .863
(.132) (.152) (.091) (.101) (.014) (.028) (.015) (.016)
Automobile:
Median .741 .762 .642 .693 .660 .709 .668 .623
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
75th percentile 1.319 1.237 .937 1.143 1.109 1.272 1.188 1.179
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.010) (.008) (.007)
B. WISCONSIN
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Medical malpractice:
Median .876 .923 .507 .576 .612 .518 .669 .545
(.027) (.040) (.031) (.019) (.010) (.016) (.035) (.011)
75th percentile 1.654 3.219 1.205 1.251 .856 .732 2.295 .763
(.049) (.196) (.046) (.050) (.027) (.022) (.173) (.014)
Automobile:
Median: .760 .762 .687 .628 .644 .648 .668 .668
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001)
75th percentile 1.184 1.096 .952 .893 .903 .899 .968 .909
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
To examine the effect of liability reform on the loss ratio distribution,
Table 3 presents the pertinent loss ratio statistics for the median and
seventy-fifth percentile of the loss ratio distribution. To the extent that
the liability reforms are most effective in reducing the substantial losses
and the very high loss ratios, the effect should not be uniform but instead
should be concentrated at the upper end of the distribution. The damages
caps component of the liability reforms particularly should tilt the effects
of the reform efforts toward the higher loss situations.
The results in Table 3, panel A, for Michigan and Table 3, panel B, for
Wisconsin are consistent with this differential effect. From 1985 to 1991
the median loss ratio in Michigan for medical malpractice drops by 0.9,
whereas the seventy-fifth percentile of the loss ratio distribution declines
by 2.3. In contrast, the performance of the automobile line loss ratio
medians and seventy-fifth percentile is relatively invariant, but these ef-
fects are not particularly comparable since medical malpractice loss ratios
tend to be more skewed. A similar and somewhat starker trend is exhib-
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ited in the state of Wisconsin in Table 3, panel B. The loss ratio median
for medical malpractice declined by 0.4 from 1985 to 1991, whereas the
decline for the seventy-fifth percentile was 2.4. The effects of the liability
reforms are most pronounced at the upper end of the distribution.
III. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE NATIONAL DATA ANALYSIS
The examination of the effect of the medical malpractice liability re-
forms nationwide will also be undertaken using data from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. These data are available for
1984-91, but since the lagged dependent variable will be included in the
analysis, the focus will be on the years 1985-91. Each observation in the
sample pertains to the total policies written by a firm that year in a partic-
ular line of insurance in a particular state. The total number of firm-state
combinations for the medical malpractice line was 1,475 in 1985 and 1,302
in 1991 (see Table 4). 19 A panel data set was created, which includes all
firms writing coverage in medical malpractice and includes the informa-
tion on premiums earned, losses incurred (detailed in the top panel of
Table 4), as well as information pertaining to the firm such as its organiza-
tional form-Lloyds, mutual, or reciprocal-and total assets of the firm
nationally. Lloyds associations consist of individual underwriters, each
of whom are responsible only for a portion of the risk that they have
underwritten. Mutual insurers and reciprocals each function as coopera-
tives in which the policyholder acts as an owner as well.2' The omitted
organizational form is that of stock companies, which account for 92
percent of all firms in the sample. As indicated in panel A of Table 4,
beginning in 1986 average premiums earned per firm in each state rose
from under $2 million to over $3 million, and losses incurred also rose,
but not by as great an amount. The loss ratio, which was calculated on
a firm-specific basis using the information above, declined from 1.1 in
1985 to 0.73 in 1991.
Using information with respect to the state in which the insurance
19 Over 8,000 observations are used in the empirical analysis, compared to 350 for a
comparable analysis using state aggregative data. The previous research on medical mal-
practice insurance uses state aggregative data to analyze the effects of the liability reforms.
These studies include an analysis of the reforms of the early 1970s (Drucilla K. Barker,
The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurance Markets: An Empirical
Analysis, 17 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 143-61 (1992)) and a more recent study of the
mid-1980s reforms and their effects on both the general liability and medical malpractice
lines (W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General
Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6 J. Risk & Uncertainty 165-86 (1993)).
20 Reciprocals differ from mutuals in that reciprocals are unincorporated and managed
by an attorney-in-fact, whereas mutuals are incorporated entities run by an elected board
of directors.
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TABLE 4
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
A. PREMIUMS, LOSSES, AND Loss RATIOS, 1985-91: MEANS (Standard Deviations)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Premiums earned 1.843 3.159 3.998 4.202 3.638 3.441 3.087
(in Millions) (9.166) (13.228) (15.018) (16.169) (14.847) (14.313) (13.581)
Losses incurred 2.195 3.107 3.387 3.232 2.161 2.198 2.264
(in Millions) (11.757) (17.531) (18.633) (18.754) (7.894) (8.825) (10.290)
Loss ratio 1.191 .990 .847 .770 .595 .640 .734
(7.583) (25.694) (11.005) (3.461) (9.423) (4.193) (12.217)
B. OTHER VARIABLES: MEANS (Standard Deviations)
1985 1991
Reform variables:
Any reform .375 .895
(.484) (.307)
Collateral Source .0 .359
(.0) (.480)




Other reforms .336 .845
(.473) (.362)
Past reform efforts:
Ceilings on Recoveries (1975-76) .227 .229
(.419) (.420)
Attorney Fees (1975-76) .509 .489
(.500) (.500)
Collateral Source (1975-76) .405 .386
(.491) (.487)
Regulation variables:
Prior Approval or Modified Prior Approval .284 .302
(.451) (.459)
Flex Rating .114 .114
(.318) (.318)










Total assets (in millions) 1,376.896 1,248.953
(56.644) (82.162)
National premiums written (in millions) 31.532 36.688
(1.960) (1.813)
State aggregate income (in billions) 88.293 108.057
(2.497) (3.187)
Treasury-Bill Rate 7.470 5.380
N 1,475 1,302
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policy was written, we constructed information pertaining to the insur-
ance regulation regime and the presence of different kinds of liability
reforms. Three types of insurance regulation were distinguished. The
most common form of regulation is use and file/file and use, in which
filings on insurance rates are required either before or after the use of
these rates. The state insurance department has the right to review and
possibly reject the use of these rates. The second most frequent type of
state insurance regulation for medical malpractice is prior approval or
modified prior approval regulation, under which rates must be filed and
approved by the state insurance department before a firm may use them.
The flex rating states impose a prior approval requirement only if the
extent of the rate increase exceeds a specified rate increase percentage
above the previously filed rates. The omitted regulation category is that
of no insurance rate regulation.
The primary matter of empirical interest will be the liability reform
variables pertaining to the mid-1980s tort liability reforms. The first vari-
able pertaining to whether a state enacted any reform pertaining to medi-
cal malpractice insurance represents an effort to capture the overall effect
of medical malpractice and liability reforms without distinguishing the
particular nature of the reform effort. The fraction of the firms in states
that have undertaken such liability reforms rose from 37.5 percent in 1985
to 89.5 percent in 1991. The four types of 1980s reform efforts that will
be broken out separately are reforms pertaining to collateral sources,
attorney's fees, damages limits, and other reforms.
A more detailed summary of the states enacting reforms and the types
of reform efforts enacted in these states from 1984 to 1987 appears in
Table 5.21 Most of the reform efforts were concentrated in 1986. The first
column of reform efforts pertains to medical malpractice, and the second
column pertains to general liability reforms, which may affect medical
malpractice liability as well. A state may appear in this tabulation more
than once. For example, Illinois undertook medical malpractice reforms
in 1985, general liability reforms in 1985, and additional general liability
reforms in 1986. Most of these reform efforts involve some type of dam-
ages cap, where these include caps on punitive damages, caps on noneco-
nomic damages, limitations on the circumstances in which damages may
be awarded, barring of punitive damages altogether, and monetary caps
on total medical malpractice damages. The collateral source rule reforms
typically pertain to offset provisions whereby private medical insurance
coverage will be taken into account when studying damages amounts.
21 Liability reform descriptions were obtained from the Alliance of American Insurers,
Civil Justice Enactments Bulletin (1985-87).
HeinOnline  -- 24 J. Legal Stud. 476 1995
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
TABLE 5

























NoTE.-Code descriptions: I = monetary cap on punitive damages; 2 = monetary cap on noneco-
nomic damages; 3 = limitations on circumstances in which damages may be awarded; 4 = punitive
damages barred in medical malpractice actions; 5 = monetary cap on all medical malpractice damages.
Limitations on attorney's fees and specific other reforms tended to be
less frequent than the collateral source rule and damages provisions.
Ideally, it would be useful to establish a uniform quantitative metric
by which the stringency of the reform efforts could be calibrated. Reform
efforts could be scored on this dimension and one could determine, for
example, how a change in a nonmonetary damages cap from $100,000 to
$200,000 would affect medical malpractice liability. Unfortunately, the
substantial heterogeneity of the reform efforts, the large qualitative com-
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included with any single reform package make it infeasible to undertake
the kind of precise quantitative assessments that one would like. Never-
theless, it will be possible to distinguish the average influence of the
reform efforts and, in some cases, to assess the role of the particular
reform components.
Although the primary focus of the article is on the liability reforms
undertaken in the 1980s, there was a similar liability reform effort that
took place in the 1970s. Over the 1975-76 period a large number of states
enacted liability reforms in an effort to stabilize medical malpractice in-
surance. These variables, which are summarized in panel B of Table 4,
are dummy variables pertaining to whether the state in which the insur-
ance company is writing coverage has adopted a particular reform. The
three different reform types that will be distinguished are ceilings on
recoveries, provisions pertaining to attorney's fees, and collateral source
rules. These measures were not as widespread as some of the 1980s
reforms, but a substantial part of the sample is affected, ranging from
one-fourth to half of the firms. These tort liability reforms enacted before
1984 may have a long-run influence on firm profitability.22
The final variables appearing at the bottom of panel B of Table 4 pertain
to other variables that will be included in the insurance analysis. The
next two measures relate to the particular firm based on the NAIC data-
total assets and national premiums written. The State Aggregate Income
variable was constructed using information on the state in which the
insurance firm wrote the policy, and the U.S. Treasury-Bill Rate is the
real inflation-adjusted 3-month Treasury-bill rate.23
IV. NATIONAL Loss RATIO EFFECTS
One objective of the liability reform effort was to stabilize the perfor-
mance of liability insurance markets. The most widely used measure of
insurance market performance is the loss ratio, which gives the loss
amounts per dollar of premiums earned. Because this measure adjusts
for the amount of insurance written, it constitutes a more meaningful
measure of the effect on insurance profitability than does examining the
total value of losses. For example, the magnitude of insurance losses
might have substantially decreased, but this might not necessarily indi-
22 Measures imposing limits on awards were especially vulnerable to constitutional chal-
lenges. In 17 states where they were enacted, 5 state supreme courts declared the limits
invalid. Only measures that survived the period have been used in this analysis.
23 Aggregate income data were obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey
of Current Business (various years). The U.S. Treasury-bill rate is published in the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1992).
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cate a change in the liability burden, as one would obtain the same effect
if firms simply ceased to write medical liability insurance.
The basic specification of the equation is an autoregressive model that
also includes a dummy variable or a set of dummy variables for tort
liability reforms as well as a series of explanatory variables, where the
equation takes the form
Log Loss Ratioi, = ot + P, Log Loss Ratio/t -I + yl Reformi, (5)
N
+ ,8xl+ 6 1i,
j=l
where all Xj,. are in logs. The lagged value of the loss ratio is expected
to have a positive effect on the current value, where this coefficient will
be 1.0 if the profitability of insurance policies written by a firm is constant
from year to year, as would be the case if the mix of insured and their loss
experience remained invariant over time. Due to the stochastic nature of
losses, this is unlikely to be the case.
The reform measure will be in terms of a 0-1 dummy variable for
whether the state enacted some type of tort liability reform for either
medical malpractice or general liability. In addition, each equation will
be reestimated, replacing the single aggregative reform variable with a
series of four detailed reform variables pertaining to limits on damages,
collateral source rules, attorney fees, and other reform efforts. Because
of the high correlation among the different reform efforts within tort liabl-
ity reform packages, it is difficult to distinguish the influence of all these
various reform components. For example, it is not possible to reliably
estimate the differential effects of medical malpractice reforms as op-
posed to general liability reforms, many of which were contemporaneous.
The other explanatory variables include a series of variables pertaining
to reform efforts prior to 1984, the state insurance regulatory regime
(Prior Approval or Modified Prior Approval, Flex Rating, and Use and
File/File and Use),24 three variables pertaining to the organizational form
(Mutual, Reciprocal, and Lloyds), the level of national premiums written
to control for the size and mix of the insurance market, the level of state
aggregate income which affects the wage rate in the state, and the cost
of providing insurance as well as the magnitude of losses. The final vari-
able is the real Treasury-Bill Rate, as higher real rates of return enable
firms to offer insurance policies with a higher loss ratio and still maintain
insurance profitability.
In addition to estimating each of the equations using ordinary least
24 State rate regulation variables were obtained from the NAIC.
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squares, we also present two other sets of estimates. The first of these
are weighted least squares estimates, where the weights pertain to the
total value of the assets of the particular firm. This adjustment is intended
to address the influence of heterogeneity of firms of different sizes. In the
absence of such weight, firms with very little insurance business would be
given the same weight as firms that had a large market share. Weights
based on asset levels were used rather than premiums since subsequent
regressions will use premiums as the dependent variable, and the loss
ratio is a function of premiums. A final set of estimates using a fixed
effects model including state-specific effects is also presented, where
these capture all time-invariant state characteristics affecting either liabil-
ity regimes or other economic conditions influencing the performance of
insurance policies.
The estimates presented in Table 6 follow many of the expected pat-
terns. This equation is similar in character to many that have appeared
in the literature.25 For example, the lagged loss ratio has a consistent
positive effect on the current loss ratio. The three 1975-76 reform vari-
ables are not statistically significant, possibly because whatever influence
they have had is reflected in the lagged value of the dependent variable.
The main matter of concern is the effect of the 1980s liability reform
measures. The estimates in the top panel of Table 6 pertain to the aggrega-
tive liability reform measure and consequently will capture the average
effect of all tort liability reform efforts. These estimates suggest that the
short-run effect of tort liability reform is to decrease the loss ratio by an
average of 19 percent for the ordinary least squares and weighted least
squares estimates and by 39 percent for the fixed effects estimates. Thus,
taking into account the additional role of time-invariant, state-specific
effects leads to a higher estimated impact of a liability reform on medical
malpractice insurance profitability. The long-run effects, which take into
account the effect through the lagged loss ratio as well are roughly double
in size-39 percent, 41 percent, and 78 percent for each of the three
equations.
26
Similar results are obtained when one reestimates these equations re-
25 See, for example, J. David Cummins & Scott E. Harrington, The Impact of Rate
Regulation in U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Markets: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of
Individual Firm Loss Ratios, Geneva Papers Risk & Ins., 1987, No. 42, at 50-62.
2 For example, to calculate the long-run effects of reform for the ordinary least squares
estimates, one has an equation of the form
Log Loss Ratio, = 1.849 + 0.512 Log Loss Ratio, - 0.188 Reform.
Since Log Loss Ratio, = Log Loss Ratio,- 1 in long-run equilibrium, the effect of the
Reform variable on the Log Loss Ratio is consequently -0.188/(1 - 0.512).
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NoTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variables were omitted from the fixed effects regressions since they did not vary within the state.
* Significant at the 95 percent confidence level, one-tailed test.
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placing the aggregative liability reform variable by a detailed set of four
liability reform measures (see the bottom panel of Table 6). The Damages
reform variable is consistently the most influential, as this variable alone
accounts for a 13 percent decrease in the loss ratio in the ordinary least
squares and weighted least squares estimates and a 25 percent decrease
in the loss ratio for the fixed effect estimates. The other influences are
more inconsistent, as the attorney fee provisions are statistically signifi-
cant in the ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results, but
not in the fixed effect results. The opposite pattern is displayed by the
Other Reforms variable, and the Collateral Source variable is never statis-
tically significant.
If it is in fact the liability reform efforts and, in particular, the damages
cap reforms that are responsible for the increased profitability of medical
malpractice insurance, then one would not expect these reforms to have
a uniform effect throughout the entire loss ratio distribution. In particular,
one would expect the largest effects to be exhibited at the upper quantiles
of the distribution, as was the case in the Michigan and Wisconsin expe-
rience.
To explore this possibility more formally, we will utilize a quantile
regression model based on the work of Koenker and Bassett. In particu-
lar, instead of focusing on the value of the loss ratio, the emphasis will
instead be on whether the loss ratio lies within a particular quantile of
the loss ratio distribution. In particular, the quantile regressions estimate
the effect of a vector of explanatory variables x on the conditional distri-
bution of the loss ratios, which we will designate by LR. Following
Koenker and Bassett, we will assume that the Tth quantile of LR given
x is linear and can be characterized by
Quant,(LRIx) = P3"x, (6)
where P, is the pertinent vector of coefficients for the Trth quantile. Thus,
this analysis enables one to determine the differential effect of the explan-
atory variable vector x on loss ratios at different quantiles.27
27 The quantile regressions were estimated using an estimator that can be characterized
by
Min [Tp(LRi1 f3'xi) + (I - r)p(LRI < P3'xi)]ILR - P'xil,p n i=1
where n is the sample size, i designates firm i in the sample, and p is an indicator function
that takes on a value of 1 if the event characterized by the specified inequality within eq.
(7) holds and a value of 0 if it does not. Following Roger Koenker & Gilbert Bassett, Jr.,
Regression Quantiles, 46 Econometrica 33-50 (1978); and Roger Koenker & Gilbert Bassett,
Jr., Robust Tests for Heteroscedasticity Based on Regression Quantiles, 50 Econometrica
43-61 (1982), we also assume that the conditional density of y given x in the rth quantile
is independent of x. To obtain the value of the asymptotic standard errors, we utilized a
bootstrap estimator. See Gary Chamberlain, Quantile Regression, Censoring, and the Struc-
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF REFORMS QUANTILE REGRESSION ON LOSS RATIOS
(Bootstrap Standard Errors Are in Parentheses)
QUANTILE
VARIABLE 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Intercept .149* .343* .522* .925* 1.492*
(.027) (.057) (.059) (.108) (.457)
Loss Ratio,-, .007* .076* .241* .674* 2.141'
(.014) (.033) (.050) (.138) (.306)
Reform -. 011 -. 057* -. 119" -. 313" -. 678*
(.011) (.017) (.021) (.045) (.200)
Ceiling on Recoveries (1975-76) -. 005 -. 005 .003 -. 016 - .073
(.013) (.015) (.015) (.033) (.144)
Attorney Fees (1975-76) 0.14 -. 005 -. 011 -0.85* -. 351*
(.010) (.011) (.013) (.029) (.130)
Collateral Source (1975-76) -. 013 -. 015 -. 005 -. 007 .080
(.009) (.013) (.013) (.029) (.131)
State Aggregate Income 2.2E-7' 2.5E-7" 1.5E-7" 3.OE-7" 2.7E-8"
(4.4E - 8) (5.6E - 8) (6.6E - 8) (1.4E - 7) (6.8E - 7)
Treasury-Bill Rate -. 002 -. 003 .005 -. 008 .024
(.004) (.006) (.006) (.015) (.050)
Lloyds - .017 - .026 .215 3.093* 3.933*
(.521) (1.060) (.890) (1.310) (1.630)
Mutual -. 047* -. 097* -. 118" - .153' -. 272*
(.011) (.015) (.022) (.043) (.161)
Reciprocal .013 .002 - .050* - 158" - .589*
(.022) (.024) (.028) (.054) (.168)
Significant at the 95 percent confidence level, one-tailed test.
Table 7 reports the striking result of the quantile regression models,
where only the estimates for the aggregative liability reform variable are
reported. 28 Results are reported for five different quantiles-10 percent,
25 percent, 50 percent (the median), 75 percent, and 90 percent. The
liability reform variable is not statistically significant at the 10 percent
quantile, which is at the bottom of the loss ratio distribution. It is statisti-
cally significant in all other cases, and the magnitude of the coefficient
steadily rises, starkly so at the 90 percent quantile, where the estimates
imply that the tort liability reform reduces the absolute magnitude of the
loss ratio by -0.68. The dramatic escalation of the effect of liability
reform on loss ratios based on the quantile regression results suggests
ture of Wages (discussion paper, Harvard Inst. Econ. Res. 1991). The particular program
used was a linear programming routine developed by William Evans at the University of
Maryland based on Koenker & Bassett, Regression Quantiles, supra.
28 Because of convergence problems, two modifications were necessary to make estima-
tion of the equation feasible. First, the variables initially expressed in log form were replaced
with the actual values, thereby creating larger differences between quantiles. Next, it was
not feasible to estimate an equation that also included some of the less important variables
in the model. The variables omitted from the equation include National Premiums Written
and the rate regulation dummy variables.
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that liability reforms are particularly influential in dampening the upper
right tail of the loss ratio distribution.
Moreover, the pattern of quantile regression results is also instructive
in indicating that this phenomenon is not simply a regression to the mean
effect. If that were the case, then one would expect there to be a signifi-
cant jump in the loss ratios in the lower quantiles. Instead, the pattern is
one of no significant effects followed by steadily rising influences, as
opposed to a pattern of estimates in which the absolute values of the
coefficients assumed a V-shaped pattern, as would be the case in the
regression to the mean situation. Overall, the effect of liability reform
appears to be quite substantial and to have dramatically transformed the
profitability of firms which otherwise would have been at the high end of
unprofitability.' It is also noteworthy that in the quantile regression results
in Table 7, one of the 1975-76 reform variables is also statistically signifi-
cant in two instances. The attorney fees reforms have a negative effect
on loss ratios for both the seventy-fifth percentile and the ninetieth per-
centile, where these influences range from one-fourth to half as large as
the effect of the 1980s reform variable.
Some of the other variables, such as the lagged loss ratio and the
organizational form variables, also appear to have a larger magnitude of
influence as one moves from the lower to the higher quantiles. Firms at
the upper end of the loss ratio distribution appear to be much more sensi-
tive to wider swings in behavior than firms at the lower end, where this
pattern is true not only for the influence of liability reform but some other
variables as well.
V. THE EFFECT ON LOSSES AND PREMIUMS
The decrease in the loss ratio implies either that loss levels decreased,
that premiums increased, or that there was a change in the growth of
both of these rates sufficient to lead to a decrease in the level of losses
relative to premiums. If the tort liability reform mechanism is operative,
then one would expect the primary effect of tort liability to be exerted
through losses rather than premiums. It may be that both of these in-
creased, but the growth in losses should be less than the growth in premi-
ums if the tort liability reforms restrain liability costs. In long-run market
equilibrium, one would expect the marginal profitability of policies to be
identical across states. However, this adjustment process is not immedi-
ate, and to the extent that one views the loss ratios before the reform era
as being aberrationally high, then one might not expect a full pass-through
of the reduction in losses to occur through a reduction in premiums.
The focus will be on regression equations involving the log of losses
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and the log of premiums, where the logarithmic transformation will limit
the influence of outliers. Each of these equations takes an autoregressive
form and is similar in character as
Log Lossesit = a 3 + 33Log Lossesi_ -1 + 3 Log Premiumsi, (7)
N
+ _Y3 Reformit + Z 5,Xiit + e3it,
j=l
and
Log Premiumsi/ = a2 + 32 Log Premiumst - I + ^Y2 Reformi/ (8)
N
+ > 5,Xii, + E2i,"
j=l
The only difference is that the loss equation also includes the contempo-
raneous value of premiums earned to control for the size of the insurance
market for which the losses are pertinent. Although the value of premi-
ums in year t is included in equation (7), which is the loss equation for
year t, these values are not simultaneously determined. The loss values
are those ultimately charged to the policy written in year t, often several
years later. The value of premiums is always predetermined before any
losses are generated and, as a consequence, can be treated as exogenous.
As in the case of loss ratio results, three sets of estimates will be
presented: ordinary least squares, weighted least squares, and fixed ef-
fects. Table 8 reports the estimates of the log loss equation, and Table 9
reports estimates for the log premium equation.
The Reform variable is statistically significant in all specifications. Lia-
bility reform on average reduces losses in the short run by 22-23 percent
based on the ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results
and by 48 percent based on the fixed effects results. Most of this effect
is captured by the detailed reform variable pertaining to damages limita-
tions, which accounts for a 16 percent reduction in losses for the first
two specifications and a 29 percent reduction in losses in the fixed effects
equation. The ultimate long-run effects of liability reforms are almost
double the value of the short-run effects, as the total reform effect is 40
percent (ordinary least squares), 43 percent (weighted least squares), and
87 percent (fixed effects). The long-run effects appear to be implausibly
large for the fixed effects results. Controlling for fixed state-specific differ-
ences controls for the influence of different jurisdiction and legal climates
that one might not wish to abstract from in determining the actual effects
liability reforms will have. The long-run estimates also presuppose the
underlying stability of the lagged relationship.
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TABLE 8
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF LoG INCURRED LOSS EQUATIONS
Intercept
Log Losses Incurred, 1
Log Premiums Earned,
Reform
Ceiling on Recoveries (1975-76)
Attorney Fees (1975-76)
Collateral Source (1975-76)
Prior Approval or Modified Prior
Flex Rating




Log National Premiums Written




























































































































NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses.
a Variables were omitted from the fixed effects regressions since they did not vary within the state.
* Significant at the 95 percent confidence level, one-tailed test.
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Attorney Fees (1975-76)
Collateral Source (1975-76)
Prior Approval or Modified Prior
Flex Rating
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NoTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variables were omitted from the fixed effects regressions since they did not vary within the state.
* Significant at the 95 percent confidence level, one-tailed test.
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The detailed 1980s reform coefficients are most influential for the loss
equation, as damages limits, attorney fees provisions, and Other Reforms
have a negative and statistically significant effect in one or more equa-
tions. The Damages variable is consistently influential, as in the case of
the loss ratio results. In particular, the Attorney Fees variable is statisti-
cally significant and negative in the first two loss equation specifications,
but not in the fixed effects results, whereas the opposite pattern is ob-
served for the Other Reforms variable, as was the case in Table 6. One
difference from the loss ratio effects is that the Collateral Source variable
also has a statistically significant negative effect in the first two specifica-
tions, but not in the fixed effects results. The main implication of these
results is that the findings are consistent with the mechanism of tort
liability reform being a reduction in losses as opposed to simply a change
in the liability insurance environment to permit higher insurance prices.
Moreover, the Damages Limitation variable is consistently the most in-
fluential in affecting losses, as was the case for loss ratios.
The two 1970s reform variables that are statistically significant have
opposite signs. Recovery ceiling provisions have a negative effect on
losses, and collateral source rules a positive effect. These influences may
be spurious effects reflecting omitted state-specific differences. The ef-
fects of the liability reform measures on the log of earned premiums, as
estimated in Table 9, do not indicate any statistically significant influences
of the 1980s reforms apart from one negative overall reform influence in
the fixed effects equation. The 1970s reform measures continue to exhibit
mixed effects. Overall, there is no clear-cut evidence of an influence of
liability reform on premiums apart from some potential modest reduction
in premiums that is not robust. The main mechanism by which the loss
ratio has been reduced has been through a decrease in the losses associ-
ated with medical malpractice insurance, which is consistent with what
one would expect from a successful reform effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
This detailed examination of effect of medical malpractice reforms on
individual firms writing medical malpractice insurance indicated that
these efforts had a rather dramatic effect. The two case studies of Michi-
gan and Wisconsin that had targeted reform efforts consisting primarily
of damages limitations indicated a clear-cut shift in the performance of
liability insurance. In particular, there was a change in the profitability
of medical liability insurance over time, increased profitability relative to
automobile insurance, and increased profitability viewed from a perspec-
tive of a differences-in-differences estimator. Moreover, these effects
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were not uniform. Instead, there was a much larger downward shift in
the upper right tail of the loss ratio distribution. The firms that would have
been most unprofitable benefited most from the damages cap reforms.
Extension of this analysis to the national reform level to consider the
state reform efforts of 1985, 1986, and 1987 using a national data set of
every liability insurance firm writing coverage in each of the 50 states
reinforced these conclusions. The loss ratios in these states were at very
high levels, with losses in excess of premiums before the reform efforts.
The liability reforms on average and the damages cap provisions in partic-
ular contributed to a substantial downward shift in the loss ratios, which
implies a rise in the profitability of insurance. In particular, 0.2 of the 0.5
drop in loss ratios from 1985 to 1991 for the sample was attributable to
the short-run effect of liability reforms, with the long-run effect of liability
reforms accounting for 0.4 of the 0.5 drop. Although other factors no
doubt were operative, such as changes in underwriting practices and
shifts in interest rates, much of the increased profitability of insurance
can be attributed to the advent of liability reforms.
A detailed examination of the effect of these reforms is consistent with
the mechanisms one would expect from a successful reform effort. In
particular, the influence of the liability reform variables on loss ratios is
accompanied by a comparable pattern of influence on loss levels. In con-
trast, premiums seem only modestly affected by the liability reform mea-
sures, so that the main mechanism has been to reduce the losses associ-
ated with policies as opposed to raising the prices that can be charged.29
Perhaps the most instructive results were those that went beyond the
conventional regression findings that focus on average performance
throughout the sample. In particular, examination of the shift in the loss
distribution and the quantile regression results for the national sample
indicated that the effect of the liability reform measures was not uniform
throughout the population of firms. The primary effect of the liability
reforms was to generate a leftward shift in the loss ratio distribution. The
firms that were outliers on the unprofitable upper right tail of the loss
ratio distribution benefited most from the liability reform measures.
Although any judgment regarding the social desirability of such
changes requires a much more detailed assessment than that offered here,
the character of these influences is quite consistent with the avowed
objectives voiced by many proponents of liability reform. Before the
29 Because none of these estimates control for the quantity of insurance purchased, one
should be careful of the nature in which such conclusions are drawn. For these reasons,
the best measure of the effect of liability reforms is to examine the loss ratio, which serves
as a measure of the inverse of the ex post price of insurance.
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reform efforts, insurers faced not only a problem associated with substan-
tial unprofitability but also a situation of considerable uncertainty. Liabil-
ity reform not only enhances profitability but also diminishes uncertainty
by having its greatest effect on the upper right tail of the loss ratio distri-
bution. It is likely that this is the type of uncertainty-downside risk-
that is the primary concern of firms. The risk of being highly profitable
is generally not a major issue, but the chance that a firm might be very
unprofitable and may even become insolvent is much more salient. Medi-
cal malpractice liability reform consequently generated a variety of di-
verse effects that one would expect from a sound reform agenda.
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